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INTRODUCTION

Up until March 2020, state supreme courts have disagreed on
the constitutionality of abolishing the insanity defense.1 Several
states had abolished or attempted to abolish the traditional,
affirmative insanity defense and replace it with a mens rea
approach.2 The mens rea approach will likely lead to more mentally
ill, criminal defendants being incarcerated rather than receiving
the treatment they need.
The purpose of the traditional insanity defense is to ensure
that criminal culpability is only imposed upon those individuals
who have the mental capacity to comply with the law.3 The purpose
of the mens rea approach, however, only allows a criminal
defendant to introduce evidence showing the existence of mental
disease in order to negate intent.4 The following two scenarios lay
out the significant differences in the two approaches.5
In the first scenario, a defendant kills someone he thinks is a
demon.6 Here, the defendant believes he is killing a demon and did
*JD, UIC John Marshall Law School 2021. Special thanks to Professor Hugh
Mundy and Professor Steven Schwinn for their guidance and inspiration for this
Comment. Also, thank you to the UIC JMLS Law Review Board, Natalia Galica,
and Lexi Hudson for their respective edits
1. See, e.g., State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992 (Mont. 1984) (upholding a statute
that abolished the traditional insanity defense and replacing it with the mens
rea approach) and Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001) (rejecting the mens
rea approach).
2. See, e.g., Korell, 690 P.2d 992 (upholding a statute that abolished the
traditional insanity defense and replacing it with the mens rea approach) and
Finger, 27 P.3d 66 (rejecting the mens rea approach).
3. ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 9 (1967).
4. See State v. Jorrick, 4 P.3d 610, 617 (Kan. 2000) (stating “[t]his approach
permits a defendant to introduce expert psychiatric witnesses or evidence to
litigate the intent elements of a crime”). “If the evidence negates the requisite
intent, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal.” Id.
5. Transcript of Oral Arg. at 38, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S.Ct. 1021 (2019)
(No. 18-6135). In the oral argument for Kahler v. Kansas, Justice Stephen
Breyer asked the Respondent a similar question. Id. He questioned:
[I]magine two defendants. Both defendants, 1 and 2, are certified by
whatever board of psychiatrists you want as totally insane . . . The first
defendant shoots and kills Smith. The second defendant shoots and kills
Jones. The first defendant thinks that Smith is a dog. The second
defendant knows it's a person but thinks the dog told him to do it . . .
What's the difference?
Id.
6. See People v. McGehee, 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714 (Ct. App. 2016) (discussing
a defendant who stabbed his mother to death, but substantial evidence showed
that he believed she was a demon at the time he killed her). See also People v.
Ramsey, 280 N.W.2d 565 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (describing a man who murdered
his wife because he believed she was possessed by a demon and needed to
restore life to her).
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not intentionally kill another human being. Thus, the defendant did
not form the required criminal intent for a homicide conviction
under the mens rea approach. This defendant is protected under
both the traditional insanity defense and the mens rea approach.
However, in the second scenario, a defendant kills another
human because a demon told him to.7 In this example, the
defendant knows and intended to kill another human being. The
defendant formed the required criminal intent for conviction.
However, what motivated the defendant to form that intent was
based on a delusion or hallucination. This defendant would be
protected under the traditional, affirmative insanity defense, but
not under the mens rea approach. There is little doubt that the
latter excludes a large percentage of defendants that would
normally qualify for the defense under the traditional approach.
On October 7, 2019, the United States Supreme Court heard
oral arguments about the case Kahler v. Kansas, discussing
questions and concerns about the constitutionality of abolishing the
insanity defense.8 The issue presented before the Court was
whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit a state to
abolish the insanity defense.9 On March 23, 2020, the Court ruled
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
require the States to adopt an insanity defense based on a
defendant’s ability to understand that his or her crime was morally
wrong.10
This Comment will first introduce background information on
the history of the traditional insanity defense and its migration
toward the mens rea approach. The following section describes the
facts of Kahler v. Kansas and analyzes both the Kansas Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court decisions in detail. The
final section of this Comment proposes means of resolving the
uncertainties and differences among the States with regard to legal
insanity.
It is important to note that this Comment is limited to
addressing the constitutionality of abolishing the insanity defense
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, this Comment will
7. See State v. Winn, 828 P.2d 879, 881 (Idaho 1992) (discussing a defendant
who poisoned her son and alleged a demon told her that her son must die); see
also People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 130-31 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (describing
an offender who hallucinated that he heard God’s voice and believed that God
commanded him to kill).
8. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 5; Amy Howe, Argument
Analysis: Justices Open New Term with Questions and Concerns About Insanity
Defense, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 7, 2019, 3:58 PM), www.scotusblog.com/2019/10/a
rgument-analysis-justices-open-new-term-with-questions-and-concerns-aboutinsanity-defense/.
9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S.Ct. 1021 (2018)
(No. 18-6135).
10. Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1027 (2020).
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only take into account legal insanity. There are noteworthy
differences between fitness to stand trial and the insanity defense.11

II. BACKGROUND
This section will set the foundation for analyzing Kahler v.
Kansas. First, it will provide background information on the
relationship between mental illness and criminality. Second, this
section will provide history and background information on the
affirmative insanity defense. This section will then introduce the
effects of the Hinckley verdict and how this decision initiated the
transition toward the mens rea approach 12. Finally, it will briefly
discuss the legal history of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause.

A. Mental Illness and Criminality
Mental disorders are not simply an assortment of unpleasant
character traits but a fixed mental state marked by biological and
cognitive abnormalities.13 For instance, extreme narcissism distorts
rational judgment, sometimes “to the point of psychosis” or “the
outbreak of insanity.”14 Narcissists attempt to escape frustration
through emotional reactions, such as repression, distortions, and
denial.15 The impairments of personality disorders can be as severe
and similar to the impairments of mental disorders, and both have
established legal insanity in the past.16
Fortunately, significant developments in insanity law took
11. People v. Sedlacek, 2013 IL App (5th) 120106, ¶ 27; People v. Clay, 836
N.E.2d 872, 884 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). The inquiry regarding fitness or
competency addresses a defendant’s ability to participate in court proceedings,
whereas insanity involves “whether a defendant, because of a mental disease or
defect, lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” People v.
Burton, 703 N.E.2d 49, 61 (Ill. 1998). A finding that a defendant is unfit to stand
trial is not “proof of insanity at the time of the offense.” People v. Manns, 869
N.E.2d 437, 443 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
12. United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982). This case
involved a man who attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan. Id. at
117. Hinckley received a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, which
sparked controversy surrounding the insanity defense. AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIM.
JUST. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-288, 7-298 (1989).
13. Frank George, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Narcissism, 1 J. BRAIN
BEHAV. & COGNITIVE SCI. 1, 6 (Feb. 2018) (noting that narcissists have steady
structural deficits in the anterior insular cortex).
14. ERICH FROMM, THE HEART OF MAN: ITS GENIUS FOR GOOD AND EVIL 73,
76 (American Mental Health Foundation Books 2011) (1964).
15. Edith Weigert, Narcissism: Benign and Malignant Forms, in
CROSSCURRENTS IN PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOANALYSIS 222, 229 (Robert W.
Gibson ed., 1967).
16. Robert Kinscherff, Proposition: A Personality Disorder May Nullify
Responsibility for a Criminal Act, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 745, 750 (2010).
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place in the United States throughout the twentieth century.17 The
current scientific approach is to allow juries and judges to
determine whether functional impairments associated with a
personality disorder sufficiently impaired an offender as to abolish
responsibility of a criminal act.18

B. The Historical Development of the Insanity Defense
History has recognized some form of the insanity defense for
thousands of years.19 Ancient societies distinguished between
blameworthy and blameless acts of harm.20 English common law
followed these same principles of legal insanity, noting the inability
to distinguish good from evil as an excuse to legal insanity.21 Around
the Fourteenth Century, there was a shift in which insanity became
recognized as a complete defense.22 By the Eighteenth Century,
courts commonly used the “knowledge of the good and evil” test in
insanity cases.23 Our founders and American courts focused on the

17. Norman J. Finkel, Insanity on Trial 63 (1988).
In the terms and practices that relate most closely to insanity and the
law, twentieth-century medico-psychological experts assume the witness
stand with far greater confidence than their forebears did: their
descriptions of types of mental disorders are more detailed and
discriminating, their diagnostic tools are more varied and validated,
their knowledge regarding physical and psychological causation is
grounded more solidly in empirics; and their treatments, be it physical,
chemical, electrical, surgical, or psychological, are more potent.
Id.
18. Id. at 755.
19. Rael Strous, The Shoteh and Psychosis in Halakhah with Contemporary
Clinical Application, 12 TORAH U-MADDA J. 158, 167 (2004). Talmudic
literature recognized madmen as a category of people who lack understanding
and are therefore exempt from criminal punishment. Id. See also Genesis 2:9,
2:17, 3:5, 3:22. “Madness” was an excuse for punishable crimes, and even the
Torah begins with an introduction of the “knowledge of good and evil” as central
to every human being. Id.
20. Anthony Michael Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins and
Development of the “Wild Beast” Concept of Mental Illness and Its Relation to
Theories of Criminal Responsibility, 1 J. HIST. BEHAV. SCI. 355, 366 (1965). The
Jewish tradition “distinguished between harmful acts traceable to fault and
those that occur without fault.” Id. Such harmful acts that occur without fault
are committed by people who are “incapable of weighing the moral implications
of personal behavior, even when willful.” Id.
21. Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1004–06 (1932)
(discussing Henry II institutionalizing the common law insanity defense in
1154); EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 247a–247b (1853)
(following the maxim that “a madman is only punished by his madness”).
22. State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 928 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J., dissenting)
(discussing the history of the insanity defense and that the defense was a
“special verdict of madness”).
23. Sayre, supra note 21, at 1235-36 (explaining that the law goes back to
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defendant’s ability to understand right from wrong,24 and that those
not fit for punishment must be acquitted.25 Juries at this time were
directed to consider whether the defendant “was able to distinguish
whether he was doing good or evil,” could “discern the difference
between good and evil,” or “had enough intelligence to distinguish
between right and wrong.”26
The affirmative insanity defense was officially formalized in
the Nineteenth Century and became known as the M’Naghten test
of insanity.27 This test arose from a case in 1843, where the
defendant Daniel M’Naghten suffered from paranoid delusions that
compelled him to attempt to kill Prime Minister Robert Peel.28 At
trial, the defendant was acquitted under the insanity defense.29 The
judges provided the following test:
[I]t must be clearly proved, that, at the time of committing the act,
the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong.30

The M’Naghten test became the accepted standard in the
United States within a short period of time but not without
criticism.31 Many courts believed the test was too narrow and

“old ethical basis of criminal responsibility” by asking whether the defendant
could differentiate good from evil).
24. People v Kleim, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 13, 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).(stating that
“[t]he inquiry to be made under the rule of law as now established, was as to
the prisoner’s knowledge of right and wrong at the time of committing the
offense”); State v. Marler, 2 Ala. 43, 48 (1841) (expressing that an insanity plea
requires “that the prisoner was incapable of judging between right and wrong”).
25. In re McElroy, 6 Watts & Serg. 451, 456 (Pa. 1843) (“When a man is
charged with a crime, and labours under total insanity, he is so clearly an
irresponsible being, that the law does not consider him a fit subject for
punishment, and he must be acquitted”).
26. Homer D. Crotty, History of Insanity as a Defence to Crime in English
Criminal Law, 12 CAL. L. REV. 105, 114–15 (1924).
27. See M’Naghten’s Case , 8 ENG. REP. 718 (1843) (establishing the
M’Naghten test of legal insanity). The terms “right and wrong” often took the
place of “good and evil,” however the phrases continued to be used
interchangeably. Id. See also Platt & Diamond, supra 20, at 1237 (tracing the
“wild beast” concept of mental illness with reference to legal insanity).
28. M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 718. The defendant thought he was
shooting the Prime Minister while experiencing paranoid delusions but shot his
civil servant Edward Drummond instead. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 722.
31. ISAAC RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY
21 (1838). Dr. Isaac Ray thought the M’Naghten Test failed to acknowledge
“those nice shades of the disease” that could render a defendant faultless for
antisocial conduct. Id. Ray also believed that the defense should turn on
whether “the mental unsoundness . . . embraces the act within the sphere of its
influence.” Id.
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supplemented it with the irresistible impulse doctrine, which states
that those who cannot control their actions should not be held
criminally liable.32 In 1955, the American Law Institute
promulgated the Model Penal Code test for mental responsibility,
which essentially combined the M’Naghten test and the irresistible
impulse doctrine.33 The language of the Model Penal Code test
makes clear that a defendant only needs to reveal “substantial”
cognitive or volitional impairments, rather than total, in order to
establish the defense.34
Throughout the twentieth century, most jurisdictions have
adopted either the M’Naghten test, the irresistible impulse test, or
the Model Penal Code test (or some minor variation).35 Forty-five
states and the federal government all provide some form of an
affirmative insanity defense based on a defendant’s lack of moral
culpability.36 However, four states have completely abolished the
defense,37 and one state provides an affirmative defense that only
encompasses cognitive incapacity, not lack of moral culpability.38

C. The Affirmative Insanity Defense
As seen from the historical development of the insanity
defense, there are many different standards of insanity for the
purposes of criminal responsibility. One reason for the absence of a
comprehensive approach is due to limited knowledge about how the
mind works.39 In addition, there is disagreement between the legal

32. See Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 866 (Ala. 1887) (explaining irresistible
impulses as “[losing] the power to choose between right and wrong, and
[avoiding to do] the act in question, as that his free agency was at the time
destroyed”); see also State v. White, 270 P.2d 727, 730 (N.M. 1954) (discussing
irresistible impulses as “deprived of the normal governing power of [her] will”),
State v. Staten, 247 N.E.2d 293, 298 (Ohio. 1969) (having no “capacity to avoid
[her] action”), and Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Met. 500, 502 (Mass. 1844)
(describing acting from “an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse”).
33. Model Penal Code § 4.01 (2020) (providing “[a] person is not responsible
for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease
or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law”).
34. Id.
35. CRIM. JUST. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 12 at 7-297 n. 15.
36. Brief for Petitioner at 26, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2019), (No.
18-6135).
37. IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3219 (2020); MONT.
CODE ANN. 46-14-102 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305(1) (2020).
38. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.47.010 (2020). “In a prosecution for a crime, it
is an affirmative defense that when the defendant engaged in the criminal
conduct, the defendant was unable, as a result of a mental disease or defect, to
appreciate the nature and quality of that conduct.” Id.
39. U.S. v. Williams, 483 F. Supp. 453, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
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profession and the medical community in formulating a uniform
standard.40
The insanity defense “defines the extent to which [those]
accused of crime may be relieved of criminal responsibility by virtue
of mental disease.”41 Generally, the purpose of the insanity defense
is to ensure that criminal culpability is only imposed on those who
have the cognitive and volitional capacity to comply with the law.42
It is well-established by the courts that those whose mental
disorders deprive them of this capacity are neither culpable nor
deterrable and therefore, should not be subject to the same
penalties as those who are sane.43
In order to successfully assert the insanity defense, a
defendant must prove that his insanity resulted from a disease or
defect of the mind.44 Unusual behavior or bizarre statements alone
are not enough to show insanity required for the defense.45
Additionally, mental illness alone is not sufficient to alleviate a
defendant of criminal liability.46

The difficulty . . . in adopting any standard of criminal responsibility is
that between the extreme cases of the raving lunatic and the man of
perfectly sound understanding is every degree of mental capacity. Those
who are mentally impaired are not easily discerned; they are not limited
to the eccentric madman. Thus, the consequent struggle exists to identify
the true capacity of the individual.
Id.
40. State v. Smith, 574 P.2d 548, 552 (Kan. 1977).
[T]he basic problem with any insanity test evolves from the inability of
the legal and medical professions to develop a mutual insanity standard.
The legal profession functions from an objective, rhetorical base which
seeks definitions and applies those definitions to the facts. It seeks the
accountability of individual actions, the protection of society and the
deterrence of crime. Conversely, the medical profession (in particular the
psychiatric branch) functions from a subjective personality base which
seeks behavioral nuances and analyzes those nuances by individual
expertise. It seeks the discovery of mental illness, the rehabilitation of
the patient and the abolition of punishment.
Id.
41. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 9.
42. Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 72 (D.C. 1976).
43. Robey v. State, 456 A.2d 953, 960 (Md. 1983).
44. See Natalie Abrams, Definition of Mental Illness and the Insanity
Defense, 7 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 441 (1979) (reviewing different versions of the
insanity defense test).
45. Albarran v. State, 96 So. 3d 131, 189 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011); People v.
Frank-McCarron, 934 N.E.2d 76, 88 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
46. Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1088 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “We do
not doubt that Fernbach suffers from some form of mental illness . . . [but the]
question is whether there was sufficient evidence of probative value supporting
the jury's conclusion that Fernbach was not insane at the time of his crimes.”
Id.
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Insanity must be proven at the time of the criminal act.47
Further, the insanity defense is either a complete defense or no
defense at all.48 It is noteworthy to mention that some jurisdictions
recognize a diminished capacity defense, under which the defendant
accepts criminal responsibility but is convicted of a lesser offense
due to a mental defect.49
The question of insanity is a legal, rather than medical,
question.50 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit provided that expert psychiatrists are to offer data and
evidence for which the legal judgment is based.51 However, once this
information is provided, “it is society as a whole, represented by
judge or jury, which decides whether a man with the characteristics
described should or should not be held accountable for his acts.”52
As previously mentioned, most jurisdictions include a defense
that tests the defendant’s capacity to understand the nature of the
act and the defendant’s ability to distinguish right from wrong.53
However, Kansas is one of five states that only recognizes the
mental disease or defect defense for mental capacity.54 The Hinckley
verdict likely caused these states to shift to the mens rea approach.

D. Effects of the Hinckley Verdict
In one of the most famous insanity cases, a man named John
Hinckley attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan and
wounded four people in the process.55 At his trial, Hinckley
presented evidence that he was suffering from a mental disease and
that his criminal actions were a result of that disease.56 The jury

47. State v. Lamb, 330 N.W.2d 462, 469 (Neb. 1983).
48. People v. Elmore, 325 P.3d 951, 966 (Cal. 2014).
49. United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 678 (9th Cir. 1988). Unlike
insanity, the diminished capacity defense is not an excuse and is concerned with
whether the defendant possessed a culpable state of mind in the commission of
the crime. Id.
50. See United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 619 (2d Cir. 1966)
(reversing the defendant’s conviction and ordering the district court to evaluate
his mental capacity based upon Model Penal Code § 4.01).
51. Id. at 619-20.
52. Id.
53. State v. France, 776 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Neb. 2009); White v.
Commonwealth, 636 S.E.2d 353, 356 (Va. 2006)
54. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3219 (2020).
55. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Hinckley v. United States,
140 F.3d 277, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
56. Hinckley, 140 F.3d at 279. Hinckley presented four expert witnesses at
trial: two psychologists and two psychiatrists. Id. All four of his experts testified
that Hinckley suffered from psychotic disorder and major depression, which
were in remission. Id. They also testified that he suffered from narcissistic
personality disorder, which was active. Id.
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found Hinckley not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”).57 The
district court then committed Hinckley to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital,
where he remained until his release in September 2016.58
The verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity in this highly
publicized case resulted in controversy and prompted a national
discussion of the insanity defense in the 1980s.59 Controversy
stemmed from the verdict, which led state legislatures to oppose the
M’Naghten Rule and create a “hostile public mood” toward the
defense.60 The American Bar Association (“ABA”) expressed that
the negative and unwarranted overreaction to the problems
exemplified by the Hinckley verdict triggered the adoption of the
mens rea approach, and the ABA outwardly rejects the abolition of
the traditional insanity defense.61

E. Transition to the Mens Rea Approach
Until recently, all fifty states and the federal government used
some version of the affirmative insanity defense that allowed juries
to reach a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.62 During the
first half of the twentieth century, three state legislatures
attempted to completely eliminate the insanity defense, but each
attempt was struck down as unconstitutional by its state supreme
court.63 The problem was the fact that each statute denied the

57. Hinckley, 672 F.2d at 132-33 (stating that insanity is an affirmative
defense, therefore the defendant carries the burden of proving insanity).
58. See United States v. Hinckley, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2016)
(discussing Hinckley’s release from prison and deciding that he would: (1) not
be a danger to himself or the public; (2) complete a daily activity log; (3) be
required to wear an ankle bracelet and/or install a vehicle tracking device; and
(4) not be permitted to access the internet for at least six months). See also
Ralph Ellis, Reagan Shooter John Hinckley Jr. Released from Hospital, CNN
(Sep. 10, 2016, 6:49 PM), www.cnn.com/2016/09/10/politics/reagan-shooterjohn-hinckley-jr-released-from-hospital/index.html (discussing the Honorable
Paul Friedman allowing John Hinckley to be released and reside in his mother’s
home under certain restrictions).
59. CRIM. JUST. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 12 at 7-288, 7-298
(expressing that “the attempted assassination of President Reagan by John W.
Hinckley, Jr., resulted in a new round of controversy over the defense” and that
the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 was undoubtedly influenced by the
Hinckley verdict).
60. Id. at 7-288, 7-301 (“Such a jarring reversal of hundreds of years of moral
and legal history would constitute an unfortunate and unwarranted
overreaction to the problems typified by the Hinckley verdict.”).
61. Id. (expressing that “[t]he American Bar Association opposes abolition .
. . [insanity] defense”); see also Brief for the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2018) (No. 18-6135).
62. CRIM. JUST. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 12 at 7-293
(stating that “mental nonresponsibility [insanity] is a jurisprudential, not a
medical, concept”).
63. See State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020, 1025 (Wash. 1910) (holding that §
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defendant his or her due process right to introduce evidence of
mental illness.64 The Supreme Court of Washington maintained
that there can be no criminal responsibility for those who are so
deprived of reason as to be incapable of forming criminal intent.65
Because evidence of a mental disorder is relevant to the question of
responsibility, it cannot be excluded when a defendant’s life and
liberty are at stake.66 The rulings in these cases established that
evidence of mental illness that may have contributed to a crime
cannot be omitted in its entirety.67
Later in the twentieth century, state legislatures in five states
eliminated the affirmative insanity defense and replaced it with the
mens rea approach.68 These states allow for the introduction of
evidence of mental illness only to rebut the mens rea element of the
crime.69 Thus, the new statutes do not fully deny the introduction
of mental health evidence like the older statutes did but severely
limit the scope of the insanity defense.70
2259 deprives a criminal defendant of his due process rights), State v. Lange,
123 So. 639, 642 (La. 1929) (declaring Act No. 17 unconstitutional), and Sinclair
v. State, 132 So. 581, 588 (Miss. 1931) (holding that the statute abolishing the
insanity defense violates Mississippi’s Constitution).
64. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020, 1024; Lange, 123 So. 639, 641-42; Sinclair, 132
So. 581, 582.
65. Strasburg, 110 P. at 1022.
No insane man can be guilty of a crime, and hence cannot be punished
for what would otherwise be a crime. The ground for this exception to
criminal responsibility is, that there must be a criminal intent, in order
that the act may constitute a crime, and that an insane person cannot do
an intentional wrong.
Id.
66. Strasburg, 110 P. at 1024.
Whatever the power may be in the legislature to eliminate the element
of intent from criminal liability, we are of the opinion that such power
cannot be exercised to the extent of preventing one accused of crime from
invoking the defense of his insanity at the time of committing the act
charged, and offering evidence thereof before the jury.
Id.
67. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020, 1024; Lange, 123 So. 639, 641-642; Sinclair, 132
So. 581, 582.
68. IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3219 (2020); MONT.
CODE ANN. 46-14-102 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305(1) (2020); Finger, 27
P.3d at 68. Nevada, Kansas, Montana, Idaho, and Utah were the five states that
adopted statutes reflecting the mens rea approach. IDAHO CODE § 18-207; KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-3219; MONT. CODE ANN. 46-14-102; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2305(1). All but the Nevada statute survived review in state courts. Finger, 27
P.3d at 86.
69. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 340 (8th ed. 2018).
Mental illness is essentially irrelevant in these four states except to rebut the
element of mens rea. Id.
70. IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3219 (2020); MONT.
CODE ANN. 46-14-102 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305(1) (2020).
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In 2001, the Nevada Supreme Court struck down Nevada’s
statute that eliminated the insanity defense, holding that it violated
due process of both the United States Constitution and the State
Constitution.71 However, Kansas, Idaho, Montana, and Utah
survived review in state court.72 Further, the state of Alaska has
not completely eliminated the affirmative insanity defense but has
limited it to considerations of mens rea.73
The United States Supreme Court has declined a factually
similar case to Kahler in the past.74 Therefore, states have remained
free to address mental illness and criminal culpability in a severely
restrictive manner, like the state of Idaho.75 There, for example,
insanity remains pertinent to culpability, but only with regard to
criminal intent.76
The Supreme Court does not provide advisory opinions77 and
generally only accepts cases where there is a disagreement among

71 Finger, 27 P.3d at 79.
The Due Process Clause mandates protection of those principles deemed
“fundamental to the American scheme of justice . . . . The history of
American jurisprudence reflects that it is a fundamental principle of our
law that a defendant who is incapable of forming the requisite intent, or
mens rea, to commit a crime cannot be convicted of a crime. One who
does not possess the necessary criminal intent is not subject to criminal
punishment.”
Id.
72 See State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 846 (Kan. 2003) (concluding the
constitutionality of § 22-3219 is not properly before the Kansas Supreme Court).
See also Korell, 690 P.2d at 1008 (upholding a statute that abolished the
traditional insanity defense and replaced it with the mens rea approach),
Searcy, 798 P.2d at 916 (concluding that neither the state nor federal
Constitutions set forth the right to plead insanity), and State v. Herrera, 895
P.2d 359, 367 (Utah 1995) (holding the Utah legislature's decision to restrict
the traditional insanity defense did not violate defendants' due process rights).
73. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.47.010 (2020). The Alaska statute is set up as
an affirmative defense, yet only protects defendants who are “unable, as a result
of a mental disease or defect, to appreciate the nature and quality of that
conduct.” Brief for Respondent at 31, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2019)
(No. 18-6135). It is unclear how a decision against the state of Kansas would
have affected Alaska. Id. It is likely that the four states with the mens rea
approach would have adopted an affirmative defense similar to § 12.47.010. Id.
74. State v. Delling, 267 P.3d 709, 721 (Idaho 2011), cert. denied Delling v.
Idaho, 568 U.S. 1038 (2012) (declining to consider whether Idaho’s abolition of
the insanity defense is constitutional).
75. Marc W. Pearce & Lori J. Butts, Insanity in the State of Idaho, 44 JUD.
NOTEBOOK 28 (Feb. 2013), www.apa.org/monitor/2013/02/jn (analyzing the case
of State v. Delling).
76. Delling, 568 U.S. at 1039 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
77. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945) (“We are not permitted to
render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the
state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount
to nothing more than an advisory opinion.”).
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lower courts.78 Here, there was a circuit split regarding the
constitutionality of states abolishing the insanity defense.79
Specifically, there was a divide among the states that have adopted
the mens rea approach to insanity80 and the state of Nevada that
has rejected it.81

F. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
The issue in Kahler is whether abolishing the insanity defense
violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the
Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
United States Constitution.82 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause provides, “nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”83 The Due
Process Clause protects those “principle[s] of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.”84 These principles emanate from history and basic
societal values.85 The Bill of Rights and the Due Process Clause
were established to “protect the fragile values of a vulnerable
citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy.”86
These deeply rooted rights and basic values that protect America’s
liberty must be followed by the states.87
The United States Supreme Court has not hesitated to protect
fundamental rights against encroachment by the states.88 The test
78. See Milner v. Dep't of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 569 (2011) (granting
certiorari in light of the Circuit split regarding the meaning of Exemption 2);
see also Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 176 (2014) (granting certiorari
principally to resolve the Circuit split about §922(a)(6)).
79. See Bethel, 66 P.3d at 846 (adopting the mens rea approach to insanity);
see also Korell, 690 P.2d at 1008 (adopting the mens rea approach to insanity),
Searcy, 798 P.2d at 916 (adopting the mens rea approach to insanity), Herrera,
895 P.2d at 367 (adopting the mens rea approach to insanity), and Finger, 27
P.3d at 86 (rejecting the mens rea approach to insanity).
80. Bethel, 66 P.3d at 846. See also Korell, 690 P.2d at 1008 (discussing the
process of Montana abolishing the insanity defense and replacing it with the
mens rea approach), Searcy, 798 P.2d at 917 (discussing how three states have
abolished the insanity defense), and Herrera, 895 P.2d at 367 (discussing Utah’s
policy decision to limit the traditional insanity defense).
81. Finger, 27 P.3d at 86.
82. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9 at i.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
84. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977).
85. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1972) (plurality
opinion).
86. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
87. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (explaining that due
process guarantees right to a jury trial in all criminal cases); BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996) (expressing how due process prohibits
“grossly excessive” punitive damages).
88. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (protecting the
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to determine whether a right is fundamental is historical practice,89
but the fact that many states follow a practice is worth
considering.90 An abundance of state courts recognize the insanity
defense as a fundamental principle of United States law that is
protected by the due process clause.91

III. ANALYSIS
This section provides a detailed analysis of Kahler v. Kansas.
It first provides factual background of the case, including the
Kahler’s family history, the shooting, and James Kahler’s history of
mental illness. Second, it introduces the Kansas statute at issue and
facts from Kahler’s trial. Next, this section analyzes the Kansas
Supreme Court decision of Kahler v. Kansas by exploring State v.
Bethel. Finally, this section ends with an analysis of the United
States Supreme Court decision and the dissent.

A. Kahler Family History
In the years leading up to James Kahler’s crime, he and his
family experienced several important events. In 2008, James and
his family lived in Weatherford, Texas.92 James and his wife, Karen
Kahler, both held successful careers, and acquaintances even

fundamental right to marital privacy by use of contraceptive). See also
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (U.S. 2015) (holding that samesex couples have the fundamental right to marry).
89. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996); Medina v. California, 505
U.S. 437, 446 (1992).
90. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952).
[T]he fact that a practice is followed by a large number of states is not
conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice accords with due
process, but it is plainly worth considering in determining whether the
practice “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”
Id.
91. See Finger, 27 P.3d at 84 (concluding that legal insanity is a fundamental
principle that is protected by both the United States and Nevada Constitutions);
see also People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 758 (Cal. 1985) (accepting the
proposition that the affirmative insanity defense is required by due
process), State ex rel. Causey, 363 So. 2d 472, 474 (La. 1978) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to plead not guilty by reason of
insanity), State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020, 1025 (Wash. 1910) (holding that §
2259 deprives a criminal defendant of his due process rights), State v. Lange,
123 So. 639, 642 (La. 1929) (declaring Act No. 17 unconstitutional), and Sinclair
v. State, 132 So. 581, 588 (Miss. 1931) (holding that the statute abolishing the
insanity defense violates Mississippi’s Constitution).
92. State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 113 (Kan. 2018).
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described them as the perfect family.93 That summer, James
accepted a new job as the city of Columbia’s director of water and
light.94 James moved to Columbia by himself, while Karen and their
three children, Emily, Lauren, and Sean, remained in Weatherford
and planned to move in the fall.95
Before James moved to Colombia, Karen had expressed an
interest in engaging in a sexual relationship with a female trainer
with whom she worked.96 James consented to the relationship
thinking that the affair would not last.97 However, the affair did not
end once Karen moved to Colombia.98 The affair caused tension at
a New Year’s Eve party in Weatherford, Texas when James became
mortified by Karen and her lover’s behavior.99 The night ended
when the Kahlers became physically aggressive with one
another.100 The couple attempted marriage counseling, but Karen
filed for divorce in mid-January 2009.101
That following March, James was arrested after Karen made a
battery complaint against him.102 Shortly after, Karen moved out of
James’ residence with her two daughters and son.103 The crumbling
of James’ marriage and family relationships led to a personal and
professional breakdown when he was fired from his new job and was
forced to move back in with his parents at their ranch.104

B. The Shooting
In 2009, the Kahler’s son, Sean, spent Thanksgiving with his
father at his grandparents’ ranch in Meriden, Kansas.105 Their two
daughters, Emily and Lauren, spent the holiday in Burlingame,
Kansas, with Karen and their grandmother, Dorothy Wight.106
Karen planned to pick Sean up on Saturday, November 28 and take
him to Dorothy’s home in Burlingame.107 Sean, however, asked to
stay longer because he was enjoying fishing and hunting with his
father.108 Karen refused to let him stay longer.109 While James was
93. Kahler, 410 P.3d at 113.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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out of the house, James’ mother drove Sean to meet Karen.110
Later that evening, Dorothy’s neighbor notified the police
regarding a suspicious man in a red Ford Explorer, which turned
out to be James’ vehicle.111 Less than an hour later, James entered
Dorothy’s house through the back door and started shooting.112
Karen and Sean were in the kitchen, while Emily, Lauren, and
Dorothy were elsewhere in the house.113 James shot Karen twice,
but did not attempt to harm Sean, who safely ran out the back
door.114
The police found Karen lying unconscious on the kitchen
floor.115 Emily was found dead in the living room.116 Dorothy was
alive, still in a living room chair, with injuries to her abdomen.117
Lauren was found upstairs conscious but barely breathing.118
Before dying, Dorothy and Lauren told the police that James had
shot them.119 The police arrested James the next morning as he was
found walking down a country road.120

C. Kahler’s Mental Health
When James shot four members of his family, he was suffering
from severe mental disease.121 He was experiencing overpowering
obsessive compulsions, extreme emotional disturbance, and
possibly dissociated from reality.122 For a long time, James suffered
from mixed obsessive-compulsive, narcissistic, histrionic, and
paranoid personality disorders and eventually fell into a severe
depression.123 Although it was undiagnosed at the time, doctors
determined that James had severe obsessive-compulsive
disorder.124 As a result, James was always fixated on maintaining a
perfect public image.125 James also “imposed stubborn controls of
110. Kahler, 410 P.3d at 113.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 114.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Joint Appendix at 84, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2019) (No. 186135).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 91-92.
125. Id. Kahler “showed preoccupation with appearing as an orderly family,
with extreme inflexibility about social mores.” Id. He also had high expectations
of his “wish for her appearance, desirability, and ‘perfect’ family life.” Id. Kahler
“thrived on the sense of self-importance, community prestige, and being
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his family.”126
In 2008, James’ zealously enforced routines began to fall apart
when the family moved to Missouri and Karen began her affair.127
James was unable to cope with the changes in his life, especially
when he realized he was no longer Karen’s center of attention.128
After Karen filed for divorce, James’ obsession about his image took
over and his depression intensified.129 Family, friends, and
colleagues noted James’ deterioration.130 His behavior toward
Karen became even more extreme and controlling.131 James
projected Karen’s betrayal onto his teenage daughters and blamed
them for Karen’s affair,132 while maintaining a close relationship
with his son.133
After the shooting, James was unable to recall any events
between leaving his parents’ house and surrendering to the
police.134 James’ inability to recall the events may indicate shortterm dissociation, which is detachment from self or loss of
memory.135 Dorothy’s LifeAlert device captured James exclaiming,
“Oh s**t! I am going to kill her . . . G-d damn it!” in a tone that
implied disbelief and dissociation.136
Before trial, James was evaluated by two forensic
psychiatrists: one serving as the defense’s expert and the other
serving the State.137 These experts agreed on many things, and both
concluded that James suffered from obsessive-compulsive
personality disorder, major depressive disorder, and borderline,

perceived as an ideal or perfect marriage.” Id.
126. Id. at 91. “Kahler demonstrated obsessive preoccupation with sexual
activity with Karen (detailed sex log in college) and highly rigid approach to
nightly sex. The family habituated to the routine.” Id.
127. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36 at 7.
128. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36 at 7-8.
129. Id. at 8.
130. Joint Appendix, supra note 121 at 64-65. In an interview, Tina McNew
stated that Kahler had “gone off the deep end and even his parents were
concerned for him.” Id. Further, Kahler felt as if “he was losing his mind” and
could not concentrate at work. Id.
131. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36 at 7. Kahler monitored Karen’s
conversations with her lover, drove 150 miles in an attempt to catch Karen with
her lover, and hired a private investigator to spy on the two of them. Id.
132. Joint Appendix, supra note 121 at 69, 97. Kahler expressed that Emily
and Lauren “became their mom” and that they ultimately “became fused in his
mind with Karen.” Id.
133. Id. at 85 (“Sean [James Kahler’s son] was more attached to him [James]
at the end. The girls were more attached to Karen”).
134. Id. at 72, 87.
135. Id.; Philip Wang, What Are Dissociative Disorders?, AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION (Aug. 2018), www.psychiatry.org/patientsfamilies/dissociative-disorders/what-are-dissociative-disorders.
136. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36 at 10.
137. Id.
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paranoid, and narcissistic personality tendencies.138 The defense’s
expert stated that James’ depression was so severe that he did not
genuinely choose to kill his family.139 In contrast, the State of
Kansas provided evidence to contradict the defense expert’s
testimony, claiming that James “methodically went through the
house shooting each of the women in turn.”140 Further, James did
not attempt to harm or shoot Sean, who James believed was the
only child that did not betray him.141 James also did not shoot the
neighbors, who were shining flashlights at him and yelling at him
to stop.142

D. Kansas Law
The Kansas legislature abandoned the M’Naghten test when it
enacted Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3220.143 The Statute provides: “It is a
defense to a prosecution under any statute that the defendant, as a
result of mental disease or defect, lacked the mental state required
as an element of the offense charged. Mental disease or defect is not
otherwise a defense.”144 This statute adopted the mens rea approach
to insanity and allows evidence of mental disease or defect to negate
the mental element of a crime.145 It also completely abandons the
defense of lack of capacity to know right from wrong.146
Mental condition is also relevant at the sentencing phase
under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6815(c)(1)(C), which allows for
mitigating circumstances where the defendant lacked substantial
capacity for judgment due to a physical or mental impairment.147
For more serious crimes, like capital murder, mitigating factors
138. Joint Appendix, supra note 121 at 74, 142-43.
139. Id. at 48-49. Dr. Peterson, the defense expert, stated that Kahler “felt
compelled and . . . was in great conflict about what he was doing . . . . [H]e had
basically for that [sic] at least that short period of time completely lost control.”
Id. He further testified that Kahler’s capacity to control his “behavior had been
severely degraded so that he couldn't refrain from doing what he did.” Id.
140. Joint Appendix, supra note 121 at 261.
141. Brief for Respondent, supra note 73 at 5.
142. Id. at 6.
143. State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 125 (Kan. 2018).
144. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (2009), repealed by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 215209. This statute titled “Defense of Lack of Mental State” first codified as § 223220 and is now codified without change since 2010 as § 21-5209. § 21-5209
(2020)..
145. Jorrick, 4 P.3d at 617.
146. Id. The mens rea approach “permits a defendant to introduce expert
psychiatric witnesses or evidence to litigate the intent elements of a crime. If
the evidence negates the requisite intent, the defendant is entitled to an
acquittal.” Id.
147. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6815 (2020) (“[M]itigating factors may be
considered in determining whether . . . [t]he offender, because of physical or
mental impairment, lacked substantial capacity for judgment when the offense
was committed”).
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include an analysis of whether “[t]he capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or to conform
the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired.”148 Finally, Kansas law gives a trial judge
the power to commit a defendant convicted of a felony to a mental
health institution instead of prison.149

E. The Trial of Kahler v. Kansas
The State charged James Kahler with one count of capital
murder and one count of aggravated battery.150 At trial, the defense
did not contest that James killed the victims.151 Instead, the
defense’s theory was that James’ severe depression prevented him
from forming the intent and premeditation required for the crime of
capital murder.152
Defense counsel introduced testimony from Dr. Stephen
Peterson, a forensic psychologist, who stated that James suffered
from severe depression and could not control his behavior at the
time he shot the victims.153 Dr. Peterson did not address whether or
not James was capable of forming the intent required to commit the
crimes.154 The State provided expert testimony from Dr. William
Logan who stated that James had the capacity to form the requisite
intent and premeditation, despite being mentally unwell.155
During closing arguments, defense counsel stressed that
James was incapable of forming the required mens rea.156 However,
the State pointed out that the defense’s expert failed to address this
specific and crucial point, and that his mental health did not act as
a barrier for conviction.157 The jury found James guilty of capital
murder.158 After hearing aggravating and mitigating evidence in

148. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6625(a)(6) (2011).
149. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3430 (2014). The judge has this authorization
when (1) the defendant needs psychiatric care and treatment, (2) such
treatment may aid in the defendant's rehabilitation, (3) the defendant and
society are not likely to be endangered by permitting the defendant to receive
such treatment, and (4) in lieu of confinement or imprisonment. Id.
150. State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 114 (Kan. 2018).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. Dr. Peterson further testified that “his capacity to manage his own
behavior had been severely degraded so that he couldn’t refrain from doing what
he did.” Id. A description of this type of behavior would potentially prove a
person to be insane under the irresistible impulse test noted above, but not to
negate mens rea. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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the penalty phase, the jury also proposed the death sentence.159
On appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, James Kahler
introduced ten issues regarding his capital murder conviction and
death sentence, including a challenge to the statute.160

F. Kansas Supreme Court Decision
The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed James Kahler’s
conviction of capital murder and his death sentence.161 Regarding
the issue of the constitutionality of the mens rea approach, the
Kansas Supreme Court rejected Kahler’s argument that the Kansas
statute violates the due process clause.162 In doing so, it heavily
relied upon its 2003 decision in State v. Bethel.163
1. Analysis of Bethel
In Bethel, the defendant Michael Bethel shot and killed his
father along with two other women because “God told [him] to do
it.”164 Bethel waived his right to a jury trial based on an agreement
between the parties.165 The bench trial proceeding was based on
stipulated facts.166 Pursuant to the agreement, the State did not
pursue the death penalty.167 Bethel was sentenced to a controlling
term of 100 years of imprisonment.168 Like Kahler, Bethel asserted
that Kansas’ mens rea approach violated his due process rights
because the insanity defense is deeply rooted in the traditions of the
United States, and therefore, is fundamental to the justice
system.169
In its analysis, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that the
insanity defense is not expressly protected by the United States

159. Id.
160. Id. The issues raised by Kahler include: 1) prosecutorial error, 2)
judicial misconduct, 3) expert witness instruction, 4) the constitutionality of
K.S.S. 22-3220, 5) lesser included offense instruction on felony murder, 6)
limitations on defense on voir dire, 7) cumulative error during the guilt phase,
8) Eighth Amendment categorical challenge to the death penalty, 9) the
constitutionality of the aggravating circumstances, and 10) sufficiency of the
evidence of an aggravating circumstance. Id. However, this Comment is limited
to the discussion of the constitutionality of K.S.S. 22-3220 and the Eighth
Amendment categorical challenge to the death penalty. Id.
161. Kahler, 410 P.3d at 133.
162. Id. at 125.
163. Id.; Bethel, 66 P.3d at 842.
164. Bethel, 66 P.3d at 842.
165. Id. at 841.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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Constitution.170 Its analysis rested on the argument that dealing
with crime is the States’ business rather than the Federal
Government’s.171 The court relied on the United States Supreme
Court’s instruction that lower courts should “not lightly construe
the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice
by the individual States.”172
2. Prior Kansas Supreme Court Opinions Considering § 223220
The Bethel Court then looked to other cases where it previously
considered and applied the mens rea approach under § 22-3220.173
In State v. Jorrick, the defendant shot the victim while everything
“was just a blur” after drinking for most of the day and smoking
marijuana.174 The defendant argued that he had no intent to kill the
victim, and that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on
diminished capacity.175 The court affirmed the trial court’s
conviction, holding that a reasonable factfinder could find that the
defendant intended to kill the victim based on the evidence
provided.176 The court also found that the jury did not need to be
instructed on diminished capacity because § 22-3220 prevents a
defendant from raising diminished capacity as a defense.177 The

170. Id. at 844.
171. Id.; See also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977)
(“[P]reventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States
than it is of the Federal Government”), and Irvine v. People of California, 347
U.S. 128, 134, (1954) (plurality opinion) (stating, “[t]he chief burden of
administering criminal justice rests upon state courts”).
172. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201–02.
[I]t is normally within the power of the State to regulate procedures
under which its laws are carried out, including the burden of producing
evidence and the burden of persuasion,” and its decision in this regard is
not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless it
offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
173. Bethel, 66 P.3d at 844.
174. Jorrick, 4 P.3d at 617 (“He claimed he was still in a "dream-like" state.
Jorrick then drove home, told his mother that he thought he had just shot
Keezer, and then went to bed”). In Jorrick, § 22-3220 was examined in the
context of diminished capacity, not insanity. Bethel, 66 P.3d at 844.
175. Jorrick, 4 P.3d at 613, 617.
176. Id. at 614. Two experts testified that the defendant was not suffering
from a major mental illness, and therefore, was able to form the intent to kill.
Id. The expert for the defense, however, testified that the defendant was
suffering from a dissociative disorder, which prevented him from forming the
requisite premeditation before the murder. Id.
177. Id. at 617 (“Kansas is among a minority of states that have done away
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mens rea approach only allows a defendant to introduce expert
psychiatric evidence to negate the intent required for the crime.178
Kansas law clearly limits the introduction of evidence showing the
existence of a mental disease.179
In State v. Albright, the defendant was convicted of
premeditated murder for stabbing the victim.180 On appeal, the
defendant argued that § 22-3220 was unconstitutional because it
violated Albright’s due process rights under the federal and state
constitutions.181 However, the defendant failed to raise the
constitutionality issue at trial and there were no exceptional
circumstances, so the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the
question was not properly before the court.182 Thus, the court did
not consider the constitutionality of § 22-3220 in Albright.183
3. Out-of-State Cases Relied Upon by Kansas in Bethel
The Court in Bethel cited to State v. Korell, State v. Searcy, and
State v. Herrera, all cases from other states that concluded that the
affirmative insanity defense is not a fundamental right.184 As shown
below, the Montana, Idaho, and Utah state legislatures abolished
the insanity defense and replaced it with the mens rea approach
like the state of Kansas.185
In Korell, the defendant, a Vietnam veteran with several
psychological problems, was convicted of attempted deliberate
homicide and aggravated assault.186 The defense argued that his
acts were not voluntary, yet three expert witnesses testified on
behalf of the State that the defendant was capable of acting

with the insanity and diminished capacity defenses.”).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. State v. Albright, 46 P.3d 1167, 1169-70 (Kan. 2002).
181. Id. at 1176.
182. Id. at 1177; see also State v. Mason, 986 P.2d 387, 389 (Kan. 1999)
(expressing, “[w]e may consider such issues in exceptional circumstances where
the asserted error involves a strictly legal question that will be determinative
of the case or where consideration of the new issue is necessary to serve the
interests of justice or to prevent a denial of fundamental rights”). The defendant
asserted that the constitutional issue of § 22-3220 was “necessary to serve the
ends of justice,” but the court found his argument unpersuasive. Albright, 46
P.3d at 1177.
183. Albright, 46 P.3d at 1177.
184. Bethel, 66 P.3d at 846; see also Korell, 690 P.2d at 995 (discussing a
defendant who took a handgun from his friend’s home and had an acquaintance
purchase ammunition before firing at his hospital supervisor), Searcy, 798 P.2d
at 915 (describing a defendant who killed a store owner while committing a
robbery in order to get money to purchase cocaine), and Herrera, 895 P.2d at
361 (discussing a defendant who shot and killed his ex-girlfriend).
185. Bethel, 66 P.3d at 846.
186. Korell, 690 P.2d at 994.
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knowingly or purposefully.187 On appeal, the defendant raised the
question of whether there is “a constitutional right to raise insanity
as an independent defense to criminal charges.”188 The court
discussed Montana’s alternate procedures for introducing evidence
of a criminal defendant’s mental condition189 and then considered
four opinions that upheld Montana’s approach to insanity.190 The
Montana Supreme Court continued with a due process analysis.191
The court expressed that the United States Supreme Court has
never held that “there is a constitutional right to plea an insanity
defense” and that this topic is generally left to the states.192 Further,
the affirmative insanity defense is not a fundamental right because
the defense “grew out of earlier notions of mens rea.”193 Essentially,
Montana believes that the concept of mens rea, rather than the
affirmative insanity defense, is deeply rooted in our nation’s history
and tradition.194 The state of Montana solely recognizes that “one
who lacks the requisite criminal state of mind may not be convicted
or punished.”195 However, Justice Sheehy of the Montana Supreme
187. Id. at 995.
188. Id. at 996.
189. Id. Montana substituted procedures for considering a defendant’s
mental condition and abolished the affirmative insanity defense. Id. Evidence
of mental disease or defect can be presented at the following three phases of a
criminal proceeding: (1) before trial, to show a defendant is unfit to stand trial;
(2) during trial, to prove that “at the time of the offense charged, the defendant
did not have the state of mind that is an element of the crime charged” or that
the defendant did not act purposely or knowingly; and (3) at the dispositional
stage, the sentencing judge can consider evidence from trial along with evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing to determine “whether the defendant was
able to appreciate the criminality of his acts or to conform his conduct to the law
at the time he committed the offense.” Id.
190. Id. at 997; see also State v. Mercer, 625 P.2d 44 (Mont. 1981) (finding
no authority holding that imprisonment instead of medical care of a person that
alleges to be insane, but has not been adjudicated insane, constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment), State v. Doney, 636 P.2d 1377 (Mont. 1981) (proving the
requisite mental state beyond a reasonable doubt is the practice in Montana,
not proving the defendant’s sanity beyond a reasonable doubt), State v.
Zampich, 667 P.2d 955 (Mont. 1983) (upholding a conviction where the
defendant may not have been acting voluntarily, but had the ability to act
purposely and knowingly), and State v. Watson, 686 P.2d 879 (Mont. 1984)
(upholding a 300 year sentence of an offender who suffered from a serious
mental disorder).
191. Korell, 690 P.2d at 998-99.
192. Id. at 999.
193. Id. “Development of the mens rea concept preceded recognition of the
insanity defense.” Id. “For centuries evidence of mental illness was admitted to
show the accused was incapable of forming criminal intent. Insanity did not
come to be generally recognized as an affirmative defense and an independent
ground for acquittal until the nineteenth century.” Id. (citing N. Morris, The
Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 477, 500
(1982)).
194. Korell, 690 P.2d at 998-99.
195. Id. at 999.

656

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:461

Court firmly stated in his dissent that Montana’s handling of the
insanity defense is unconstitutional for two reasons: (1) it deprives
an insane defendant of jury trial for each element of the crime he or
she is charged, thereby depriving the defendant of due process, and
(2) it intrudes upon a defendant’s right against selfincrimination.196
In Searcy, the Idaho Supreme Court followed the reasoning of
the Montana Supreme Court.197 In Searcy, the defendant appealed
his conviction of first-degree murder with a “determinate life
sentence without the possibility of parole.”198 The Supreme Court of
Idaho concluded that the United States and Idaho Constitutions do
not require an insanity defense and that the Idaho statute did not
deprive the defendant of his due process rights.199 The court reached
this conclusion by following an analysis similar to that of the
Montana Supreme Court in Korell.200 For instance, the court first
looked to State v. Beam, where the Idaho Supreme Court upheld §
18-207 against a related argument.201 In Beam, the court stated
that § 18-207 reduces the question of mental condition to an
evidentiary question, but still recognizes that only responsible
defendants can be convicted.202
Finally, in Herrera, two defendants challenged the
constitutionality of § 76-2-305, otherwise known as Utah's insanity
defense.203 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah expressed that it
could not strike down legislation unless it clearly violated the state
or federal constitutions.204 The court further held that the Utah
statute is constitutional and that there is no federal or state due
process right to an independent insanity defense.205

196. Id. at 1005-06 (Sheehy, J., dissenting) (“If the criminal act is the
product of mental aberration, and not of a straight-thinking cognitive direction,
it would seem plausible that society should offer treatment, but if not treatment,
at least not punishment.”).
197. Bethel, 66 P.3d at 847; see also Searcy, 798 P.2d at 915 (describing a
defendant who killed a store owner while committing a robbery in order to get
money to purchase cocaine).
198. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 915.
199. Id. at 919; Bethel, 66 P.3d at 847.
200. Bethel, 66 P.3d at 847; Searcy, 798 P.2d at 917-919.
201. Searcy, 798 P.2d at 917; see also State v. Beam, 710 P.2d 526 (Idaho
1985) (discussing a defendant who appealed his conviction of first-degree
murder and death sentence for raping and murdering a thirteen-year-old girl).
202. Beam, 710 P.2d at 531. (“[Section] 18-207(c) specifically provides that a
defendant is not prohibited from presenting evidence of mental disease or defect
which would negate intent.”).
203. Herrera, 895 P.2d at 361. Herrera is an interlocutory appeal, in which
two cases were consolidated for appellate purposes. Id.
204. Id. at 363 (“There is no doubt that we cannot strike down any legislation
unless it expressly violates the constitution.”).
205. Id. at 365-67.
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G. The Defense’s Argument
After the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
decision, James Kahler asked the United States Supreme Court to
determine whether Due Process requires the States to offer an
insanity defense that acquits criminal defendants who cannot
differentiate right from wrong.206 The Court granted certiorari and
heard oral arguments on October 7, 2019.207 As stated above, Kahler
argued that Kansas’ version of the insanity defense violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.208 The Defense in
Kahler failed to persuade both the Kansas Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court that the mens rea approach violated
James Kahler’s due process rights.209
Several state courts recognize legal insanity as a deeply rooted,
fundamental principle that is protected by the Due Process
Clause.210 Three state supreme courts specifically overturned
statutes that abolished the insanity defense and held those efforts
as unconstitutional.211 The precedential value of these earlier cases
is questionable because, unlike the mens rea approach, these
unconstitutional statues failed to replace the affirmative insanity
defense with a doctrine that considers some aspect of mental
deficiency.212
James Kahler relied upon the Nevada Supreme Court’s ruling
in Finger v. State in which the Court held that legal insanity is a
fundamental principle in the United States.213 In Finger, the
defendant was accused of murdering his mother and intended to

206. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1027.
207. Kahler v. Kansas, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019); Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 5.
208. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1027.
209. Id.; Kahler, 410 P.3d at 125.
210. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36 at 17 (citing Finger, 27 P.3d at 84);
People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 758-59 (Cal. 1985); State ex rel. Causey, 363
So. 2d 472, 474 (La. 1978); Ingles v. People, 22 P.2d 1109, 1111 (Colo. 1933);
People v. Hill, 934 P.2d 821, 825 (Colo. 1997); Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581, 582
(Miss. 1931); State v. Lange, 123 So. 639, 642 (La. 1929); State v. Strasburg,
110 P. 1020, 1021 (Wash. 1910)).
211. See Strasburg, 110 P. at 1025 (concluding that the defendant’s
constitutional rights were violated by instructing the jury that insanity was not
a defense); see also Lange, 123 So. at 643 (declaring a Louisiana statute
unconstitutional because it withdrew final determination of insanity from a
jury), and Sinclair, 132 So. at 582 (declaring a statute that does not allow
insanity to be a defense for murder indictments a violation of due process and
unconstitutional).
212. CRIM. JUST. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 1235 at 7-301
n.38.
213. Kahler, 410 P.3d at 125; see also Finger, 27 P.3d at 86 (discussing a
defendant who was charged for murdering his mother by stabbing her in the
head with a knife).
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assert the insanity defense.214 However, the Nevada Legislature
abolished the insanity defense in 1995.215 The district court
convicted the defendant of second-degree murder and sentenced
him to serve life in prison.216 The defendant challenged his
conviction on Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.217
While neither the United States nor the Nevada Constitutions
explicitly require an affirmative insanity defense, the Nevada
Supreme Court expressed that an individual cannot be convicted of
a crime without the requisite intent to commit the offense.218 The
Court decided that the Nevada statute allowed an individual who
lacks the requisite intent or mens rea of a criminal offense to be
convicted of that offense, and therefore violated due process.219 The
Nevada Supreme Court stated, “[i]nsanity is a mental condition
that interferes with the ability of a person to form criminal
intent.”220 The Kahler court, however, stood by its decision in Bethel,
and rejected the Nevada Supreme Court’s reasoning.221
James Kahler also addressed a written dissent from the denial
of certiorari in Delling v. Idaho.222 Here, three justices stated that
they would have granted the petition for certiorari to address
whether Idaho’s approach to insanity is consistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment.223 In State v. Delling, the defendant
pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.224 The defendant, however,
preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion which declared
the I.C. § 18-207 unconstitutional.225 The Idaho Supreme Court
upheld I.C. § 18-207 as constitutional and affirmed the district
court's denial.226 The defendant then petitioned for writ of

214. Finger, 27 P.3d at 68.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 86.
220. Id.
Individuals are considered to be legally insane when their mental
condition rises to a level so as to relieve them of criminal culpability for
their actions because they are incapable of developing the necessary
mens rea. Where the mens rea of a crime requires that defendants
understand the nature and consequences of their conduct and that the
conduct is wrong, then legal insanity is established when one of these
two elements is missing . . . The Legislature cannot abolish the concept
of legal insanity.
Id.
221. Kahler, 410 P.3d at 125.
222. Id.; Delling, 267 P.3d at 721.
223. Delling, 568 U.S. at 1041.
224. Delling, 267 P.3d at 711.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 721.
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certiorari, but the United States Supreme Court denied it.227
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Sotomayor, dissented the denial of certiorari.228 The three justices
emphasized how criminal punishment is improper for those who are
unable to tell right from wrong by reason of insanity.229 Similar to
Kansas, insanity is only applicable with regard to intent and mens
rea in Idaho.230 The justices, however, stressed that this
modification from the affirmative insanity defense is
“significant.”231 Idaho’s standard permits the conviction of an
individual who lacked the capacity to understand right from wrong,
but understood the nature of his or her actions.232 In Kahler, the
Kansas Supreme Court stated that the Delling dissent has no effect
on its decision.233

H. United States Supreme Court Decision of Kahler v.
Kansas
On March 23, 2020, the United States Supreme Court held that
Due Process does not require the States to adopt an insanity test
that turns on a defendant’s ability to recognize that his or her crime
was wrong.234 As shown below, the Court cites to several previous
Supreme Court decisions in its analysis.
1. Previous United States Supreme Court Decisions on the
Insanity Defense
Before Kahler, the Supreme Court had not held whether the
Constitution requires an insanity defense.235 Historically,
standards and procedures regarding the insanity defense have been
left up to state choice;236 however, the Court has now decided that

227. Delling, 568 U.S. at 1038.
228. Delling, 568 U.S. at 1039 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1040.
232. Id.
233. State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 125 (Kan. 2018).
234. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1027.
235. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752 n.20 (2006) “We have never held
that the Constitution mandates an insanity defense, nor have we held that the
Constitution does not so require. This case does not call upon us to decide the
matter.” Id.
236. Id. at 752. (“It is clear that no particular formulation has evolved into
a baseline for due process, and that the insanity rule, like the conceptualization
of criminal offenses, is substantially open to state choice”); see also Leland, 343
U.S. 790 (holding that an Oregon statute the required a defendant to establish
the insanity defense beyond a reasonable doubt did not violate the due process
clause).
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states can completely abolish the affirmative defense.237
Regarding insanity, the Supreme Court has held that an
indigent defendant has a federal constitutional right to receive
assistance from a psychiatric expert at state expense238 and that
experts must work independently from the prosecution.239 The
Court has also held that narrowing the insanity defense to only the
moral incapacity prong did not violate due process.240 For instance,
in Clark v. Arizona, the defendant, who shot and killed a police
officer at a traffic stop, relied upon his paranoid schizophrenia to
argue that he lacked the specific intent to shoot the officer at the
time of the incident.241 However, under § 13-502(A), the state of
Arizona restricted its insanity defense to prove that the defendant
did not know the wrongfulness of his acts.242 The trial court ruled
that the defendant could not rely on evidence of a mental disorder
to dispute the mens rea element.243 The purpose of this rule is to
avoid confusing and misleading the jury through the introduction of
psychological or psychiatric testimony.244 The United State
Supreme Court held that Arizona’s insanity defense did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause by stating the
defense solely in terms of capacity to tell right from wrong.245 In its
decision, Justice Souter noted, “We have never held that the
Constitution mandates an insanity defense, nor have we held that
the Constitution does not so require. This case does not call upon us
to decide the matter.”246
Further, in Leland v. Oregon, the defendant was tried for
murder and asserted the insanity defense, but was found guilty and
sentenced to death.247 An Oregon statute required the defendant to
237. See Cynthia Calkins, Can a State Abolish the Insanity Defense?, 50 JUD.
NOTEBOOK 31 (May 2019), www.apa.org/monitor/2019/05/jn (analyzing the case
of Kahler v. Kansas).
238. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (reversing a conviction
because due process requires that the state provide psychiatric assistance).
239. McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790, 1793 (2017) (“[T]he State must
provide an indigent defendant with access to a mental health expert who is
sufficiently available to the defense and independent from the prosecution to
effectively assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.”).
240. Clark, 548 U.S. at 779.
241. Id. at 743.
242. Id. at 744; see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-502 (2008) (stating, “[a] person
may be found guilty except insane if at the time of the commission of the
criminal act the person was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such
severity that the person did not know the criminal act was wrong”).
243. Clark, 548 U.S. at 745 (citing State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046 (Ariz. 1997)
(en banc), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1234 (1997)).
244. Clark, 548 U.S. at 775.
245. Id. at 756 (“We are satisfied that neither in theory nor in practice did
Arizona's 1993 abridgment of the insanity formulation deprive Clark of due
process.”).
246. Id. at 752 n.20.
247. Leland, 343 U.S. at 791.
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prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt; the defendant
appealed, arguing that this statute violated his due process rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.248 However, the Court
stated that:
The fact that a practice is followed by a large number of states is not
conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice accords with due
process, but it is plainly worth considering in determining whether
the practice ‘offends some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental’.249

The United States Supreme Court therefore affirmed the
defendant’s conviction, holding that Oregon’s statute was not
unconstitutional merely because it placed a heavier burden of proof
on the defendant than many other states.250
In Powell v. Texas, the defendant was found guilty for being in
a state of intoxication in a public place, in violation of Article 477 of
the Texas Penal Code.251 The defense counsel argued that the
defendant was inflicted with the “disease of chronic alcoholism” and
that criminally punishing him for his conduct violates the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.252 While the facts and outcome of
Powell are irrelevant to this Comment, Justice Marshall provided
some useful insight.253 In the opinion, Justice Marshall stated:
[T]his Court has never articulated a general constitutional doctrine
of mens rea. We cannot cast aside the centuries-long evolution of the
collection of interlocking and overlapping concepts which the common
law has utilized to assess the moral accountability of an individual
for his antisocial deeds. The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea,
insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have historically provided
the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between
the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral,
philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This process
of adjustment has always been thought to be the province of the
States.254

Justice Marshall further expressed:
Nothing could be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled into
defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms . . . But

248. Id. at 792 (“When the commission of the act charged as a crime is
proven, and the defense sought to be established is the insanity of the
defendant, the same must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt[.]").
249. Id. at 798 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
250. Id. at 798, 802.
251. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517 (1968) ("Whoever shall get drunk or
be found in a state of intoxication in any public place, or at any private house
except his own, shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars.").
252. Id.
253. Id. at 535-36.
254. Id.
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formulating a constitutional rule would reduce, if not eliminate, that
fruitful experimentation, and freeze the developing productive
dialogue between law and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold.
It is simply not yet the time to write into the Constitution formulas
cast in terms whose meaning, let alone relevance, is not yet clear
either to doctors or to lawyers.255

The Supreme Court found that the defendant’s conviction was
not unconstitutional because the lower court did not seek to punish
the defendant’s condition, but rather it sought to punish his public
behavior that raised safety concerns.256
2. United States Supreme Court Analysis of Kahler
The Court references the aforementioned Supreme Court
decisions in its analysis of Kahler.257 In her opinion, Justice Elena
Kagan began by stating that Kahler had to overcome a high bar in
arguing that the Kansas statute violates his constitutional rights.258
Kagan explained that a state law regarding criminal liability will
only violate due process if the law “offends some principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.”259 In applying that standard, the Court
looks to historical practice, including early judicial decisions.260
As stated above, the Supreme Court has largely left decisions
regarding criminal liability to the States.261 The Court cited to
Justice Marshall’s opinion in Powell v. Texas, agreeing that
doctrines of insanity and mens rea are constantly changing and that
it would be wrong for the Court to define some sort of insanity test
because it would decrease experimentation.262 Kagan noted that
there are many differing opinions and uncertainties regarding
mental illness and the human mind in general.263 On such unsettled
ground, the Supreme Court has hesitated to reduce
experimentation by outlining a specific insanity defense.264 Kagan
then provides Leland v. Oregon and Clark v. Arizona as two
examples where the Court has declined to define a test for
255. Id. at 536-37.
256. Id. at 532 (“The State of Texas thus has not sought to punish a mere
status, as California did in Robinson . . . Rather, it has imposed upon appellant
a criminal sanction for public behavior which may create substantial health and
safety hazards, both for appellant and for members of the general public.”).
257. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1027-1029.
258. Id. at 1027.
259. Id. (citing Leland, 343 U.S. at 798).
260. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1027-28 (asking whether a rule is “so entrenched
in the central values of our legal system—as to prevent a State from ever
choosing another”); Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 43.
261. Clark, 548 U.S. at 752 n.20.
262. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1028 (citing Powell, 392 U.S. at 535-36).
263. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1028.
264. Id.
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insanity.265
The Supreme Court then refutes the defense’s argument that
the Kansas insanity defense statute violates due process.266 Kahler
maintains that the moral-incapacity test is the touchstone of legal
insanity.267 The Court agrees that insanity as relief of responsibility
for a crime has been recognized for thousands of years.268 However,
the Court did not find that Kansas diverges from this broad notion
of insanity.269 The state has an insanity defense that negates
criminal liability, even if it does not include a moral-incapacity
prong.270 While Kansas may not follow the traditional approach to
insanity, it still considers mental health at both trial and
sentencing.271
The Court does not agree with Kahler that due process requires
a specific test for insanity.272 History reveals early versions of
insanity that favor a moral incapacity approach, but also versions
based on a mens rea approach.273 Courts became more accepting of
an insanity test based on moral incapacity only after M’Naghten in
1843.274 Still, the United States Supreme Court makes clear that
the moral incapacity prong of the M’Naghten test is not a
fundamental principle.275
For these reasons, the Court declined to require the States to
adopt a specific insanity test based on a defendant’s ability to
recognize right from wrong.276 Kahler v. Kansas settles the question
of whether the States can abolish the traditional, affirmative
insanity defense and replace it with a mens rea approach.277 This
decision gives states the choice in adopting an insanity defense.278
265. Id. at 1028-29; see generally Leland, 343 U.S. 790 (holding that an
Oregon statute that required a defendant to establish the insanity defense
beyond a reasonable doubt did not violate the due process clause); see also Clark,
548 U.S. 735 (determining that Arizona’s insanity defense which was stated
solely in terms of the ability to tell right from wrong did not violate due process).
266. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1029.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1030.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1030-31.
271. Id. at 1037.
272. Id. at 1031-32.
273. Id. at 1032-34 (referencing common law cases that focus on cognitive
incapacity approach). For example, a test in Rex v. Arnold associated lack of
reason and mens rea and provided that if a man is “deprived of his reason, and
consequently of his intention, he cannot be guilty.” Id. at 1033 (citing Rex v.
Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764 (1724)).
274. Id. at 1034.
275. Id. at 1035 (citing Clark, 548 U.S. at 749) (stating, “History shows no
deference to M'Naghten that could elevate its formula to the level of
fundamental principle”).
276. Id. at 1037.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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I. Kahler v. Kansas Dissent
Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor, dissented to the majority
opinion.279 Interestingly, these same three Justices dissented to the
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Delling v. Idaho.280 In his
Kahler dissent, Justice Breyer explained that more defendants will
be convicted under the mens rea approach to insanity.281 He also
rejected Kansas’ argument that it had not abolished the insanity
defense, but simply changed when a defendant can present mentalcapacity evidence to the sentencing phase.282 According to Justice
Breyer, history and tradition indicate that insane defendants
should not be found guilty in the first place.283
Under Kansas law, insane defendants are exposed to harsh
punishments, including the death penalty.284 Moreover, Kansas’s
sentencing provisions do not alleviate the stigma that is associated
with a criminal conviction.285 Forty-five states, along with the
Federal Government and the District of Colombia, recognize an
insanity defense that considers whether the defendant knew the
difference between right and wrong.286 In general, Justice Breyer
believes that Kansas’ view contradicts a fundamental tradition of
criminal law that dates back to the country’s founding.287

279. Id. at 1037-38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
280. Id.; see also Delling, 568 U.S. at1039 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justices Ginsberg and Sotomayor joined Justice Breyer in dissenting to the
denial of certiorari. Id.
281. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1038 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Consider two similar prosecutions for murder. In Prosecution One, the
accused person has shot and killed another person. The evidence at trial
proves that, as a result of severe mental illness, he thought the victim
was a dog. Prosecution Two is similar but for one thing: The evidence at
trial proves that, as a result of severe mental illness, the defendant
thought that a dog ordered him to kill the victim. Under the insanity
defense as traditionally understood, the government cannot convict
either defendant. Under Kansas' rule, it can convict the second but not
the first.
Id.
282. Id. at 1049.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1049-50.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1046.
287. Id. at 1050.
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IV. PROPOSAL
This section suggests various means of resolving the
differences in the insanity defense among the States. First, the
United States Supreme Court should reconsider and rule in favor of
the traditional insanity defense. Second, this section proposes
various changes to be made to the insanity defense, such as
restricting the types of mental health disorders and eliminating the
volitional defense. Finally, this section suggests that sentencing
should not be left to the discretion of a judge, but rather to an
unbiased expert.

A. Supreme Court Should Rule in Favor of the
Traditional Insanity Defense
The first potential solution to this issue is for the United States
Supreme Court to reconsider and rule in favor of an insanity
defense that encompasses criminal blameworthiness and moral
culpability. Specifically, the Court should require an affirmative
insanity defense that encompasses a criminal defendant’s ability to
understand the wrongfulness of his or her conduct. The inclusion of
criminal blameworthiness warrants a deeper inquiry than the mens
rea approach.288 This is because it entails a “certain quality of
knowledge and intent transcending a minimal awareness and
purpose.”289 For example, the criminal defendant who knowingly
and deliberately kills another human under psychotic delusions and
hallucinations would be held criminally responsible and convicted
under the mens rea approach.290 The mens rea approach is not only
gravely unjust but also opposes the framework of this country’s
criminal justice system.291
If the United States Supreme Court required that all
jurisdictions enact an insanity defense that considers not just
criminal intent, but also moral culpability, then there likely would
have been little change throughout the country. The four states that
have adopted the mens rea approach would be compelled to revert

288. CRIM. JUST. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 12 at 7-301.
289. Id.
290. Id.; see also Serravo, 823 P.2d at 130 (holding that a defendant could
be found legally insane where the defendant's cognitive ability to distinguish
right from wrong at the time of committing a crime had been destroyed as a
result of a psychotic delusion).
291. See Bethea, 365 A.2d at 74 (stating the purpose of the insanity defense
is to ensure that criminal culpability is only imposed on those who have the
capacity to comply with the law); see also Robey, 456 A.2d at 960 (stating that
those criminal defendants whose mental disorders deprive them of this capacity
are neither culpable nor deterrable, and should not be subject to the same
penalties as those who are sane).
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back to the affirmative defense that includes a moral incapacity
prong.
Conversely, because the Court permitted the States to abolish
the affirmative defense in its entirety, several states might follow
Montana, Idaho, Utah, and Kansas in adopting the mens rea
approach. As a result, courts will likely see detrimental effects.292
For instance, a study of mental disorder claims pre- and postabolition of the insanity defense in Montana found three major
effects.293 First, there were still approximately the same amount of
mental illness defenses raised by defendants after the mens rea
reform, and Montana essentially eliminated insanity acquittals.294
Second, a larger portion of defendants were found guilty and
convicted.295 The increase in convictions confirms that the mens rea
approach exposes severely mentally ill offenders to imprisonment
and unjust punishment.296 Lastly, the study found that a decline in
acquittals by reason of insanity led to a significant increase in
offenders found incompetent to stand trial.297 In other words,
offenders who otherwise would be competent to stand trial but
acquitted under the affirmative insanity defense, are now being
found incompetent instead of acquitted under the insanity
defense.298 Those found incompetent to stand trial often had their
charges dismissed or deferred, and being incompetent to stand trial
did not ensure hospitalization or treatment.299 Overall, this study
demonstrated that the more restrictive mens rea approach to
insanity correlates with fewer involuntary hospitalizations for
those defendants that raise the mental disease defense at trial.300 It
is highly likely that all jurisdictions that adopt the mens rea
approach will notice similar, negative effects due to the ruling in
Kahler.

292. Brief of Amicus Curiae 290 Crim. Law and Mental Health Law
Professors in Support of Petitioner's Request for Reversal and Remand at 14,
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. (2019) (No. 18-6135).
293. Id. See also Lisa Callahan et al., The Hidden Effects of Montana's
“Abolition” of the Insanity Defense, 66 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 103 (1995) (explaining
that the number of acquittals due to mental disease dropped from 38 NGRI
verdicts in the three years before the change to 6 NGRI acquittals in the six
years after the adoption of the mens rea approach).
294. Id. at 107, 116.
295. Id. at 116.
296. Brief of Amicus Curiae 290 Crim. Law and Mental Health Law
Professors, supra note 292 at 14.
297. Callahan, supra note 293 at 109, 116.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 116 (explaining how all 38 defendants found NGRI were
hospitalized in the three years before the mens rea approach, but less than twothirds of the 63 of the offenders found incompetent to stand trial received
hospitalization in the six years after the change).
300. Id.
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B. Changes Must be Made to the Affirmative Insanity
Defense
Regardless of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kahler, there are
still a multitude of issues and inconsistencies with the affirmative
insanity defense. The second prong of this proposal is to more
clearly define a test for insanity. Of course, mental illness is highly
subjective and difficult to measure.301 Insanity defense tests ask
indeterminate questions and prescribe a behavioral continuum.302
With that being said, questions about insanity are no more difficult
to answer than judgments regarding reasonableness or
recklessness that juries routinely make.303
It is important to note, however, that this Comment does not
propose total consistency in one, specific insanity defense
throughout the states. Constitutionalizing one standard for
insanity would impede future development of the insanity defense.
There must be continued experimentation among the states,
especially considering psychology is constantly advancing.
1. Restrict the Types of Mental Health Disorders for the
Insanity Defense
First, the types of mental health disorders and diseases that
serve as a basis for the insanity defense should be restricted. There
are many vague and broad interpretations of the term “mental
disease,” which leads to disagreement in psychiatric expert opinions
on causes of criminal behavior and a loss of public trust.304 The
Diagnostic Statistical Manual includes the criteria for various
mental illnesses, some of which are more likely to result in
delusions, hallucinations, and lost perception of reality.305 The test
for insanity should express which of these mental diseases and
disorders must be present in order to raise the defense. In other
words, the test should clearly state which mental illnesses
constitute moral blamelessness.
For instance, those criminal defendants with antisocial
personality disorder, or psychopathy, are generally not considered
“morally blameless” although they lack the capacity to distinguish
right from wrong.306 Psychopathy is characterized by lack of
301. Brief of Amicus Curiae 290 Crim. Law and Mental Health Law
Professors, supra note 292 at 20.
302. Id. at 20-21.
303. Id. at 21.
304. CRIM. JUST. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 12 at 7-304.
305. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013).
306. NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982); see also
Robert Kinscherff, Proposition: A Personality Disorder May Nullify
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empathy and guilt, manipulativeness, impulsivity, and often,
criminal behavior.307 For this reason, psychopaths are normally not
allowed to raise the insanity defense.308 Psychopathy and antisocial
personality disorder are more permanent mental illnesses with a
small possibility for successful treatment and change.309
2. Eliminate the Volitional Test for Insanity
The volitional test for insanity reflected optimism in the field
of clinical psychology.310 Unfortunately, experience has not
returned this optimism, and behavioral science has not yielded
clinical tools.311 The fact that an impulse is unusual does not prove
that it is irresistible.312 The American Psychological Association
stated that testimony under a cognitive test is more likely to be
established from scientific foundation than testimony under a
volitional test.313 Rejecting the volitional criteria for insanity and
focusing, instead, on whether a criminal defendant could appreciate
the wrongfulness of his or her conduct is in unison with current
clinical findings.314 This approach concentrates on objective
psychiatric factors to consider when determining responsibility for
a crime and reduces speculation in expert psychiatric testimony.315

Responsibility for a Criminal Act, 38 J. L., MED., & ETHICS, 745-59 (2010)
(explaining how certain categories of mental illness are excluded from meeting
the threshold requirement of raising the insanity defense).
307. Helge Hoff et al., Evidence of Deviant Emotional Processing in
Psychopathy: A fMRI Case Study, 119 INT’L J. NEUROSCIENCE 857 (2009).
308. Kinscherff, supra note 306 at 745-59.
309. Id.
310. CRIM. JUST. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 12 at 7-304 (“The
inclusion in the ALI test of a volitional element reflected a wave of clinical
optimism that scientific knowledge concerning psychopathology had progressed
substantially enough to permit informed judgments about the causes of
unknown behavior.”).
311. CRIM. JUST. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 12 at 7-304
(explaining how there is no objective standard to differentiate between impulses
that were irresistible and impulses that were merely not resisted).
312. Barbara Wootton, The Insanity Defense, 77 YALE L.J. 1019, 1026-27
(1968) (reviewing ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 9
(1967)). The author notes how it is impossible to devise a volitional test where
the validity can be objectively established. Id.
313. CRIM. JUST. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 12 at 7-305; see
also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 11,
12 (Dec. 1982) (expressing how psychiatric testimony on volition is more likely
to confuse jurors than psychiatric testimony on cognition).
314. Statement on the Insanity Defense, supra note 313 at 12.
315. CRIM. JUST. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 12 at 7-306.
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C. Sentencing of the Insane Should Not Be Left to the
Discretion of a Judge
The third potential solution to this issue is to allow unbiased
mental health experts to make sentencing decisions regarding
defendants that raise the insanity defense. Many states that have
adopted the mens rea approach permit the introduction of evidence
on moral blameworthiness at the sentencing phase.316 This allows
the trial court to have discretion to place a criminal defendant in a
mental institution.317
Sentencing the insane should never be left to the discretion of
a judge or jury because they do not specialize in mental disease or
defects. Moral culpability, which is the basic concept of the insanity
defense, is evident and considered in the sentencing context.318 In
Korell, Justice Haswell stated:
It is further argued that subjecting the insane to the stigma of a
criminal conviction violates fundamental principles of justice. We
cannot agree. The legislature has made a conscious decision to hold
individuals who act with a proven criminal state of mind accountable
for their acts, regardless of motivation or mental condition. Arguably,
this policy does not further criminal justice goals of deterrence and
prevention in cases where an accused suffers from a mental disease
that renders him incapable of appreciating the criminality of his
conduct. However, the policy does further goals of protection of society
and education.319

Further, in the dissenting opinion of State v. Stacy, Justice
Henry stated, "the confinement of the insane is the punishment of
the innocent; the release of the insane is the punishment of
society.”320
The opinions of Justice Haswell and Justice Henry could not
be more wrong. There is no evidence that the insanity defense or
released acquittees pose a risk to public safety.321 Rather, the

316. Korell, 690 P.2d at 996. In Montana, the sentencing judge can consider
evidence from trial along with evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing to
determine “whether the defendant was able to appreciate the criminality of his
acts or to conform his conduct to the law at the time he committed the offense.”
Id.
317. Brief of Amicus Curiae 290 Crim. Law and Mental Health Law
Professors, supra note 292 at 17.
318. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (explaining, “[t]he heart
of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related
to the personal culpability of the criminal offender”); see also Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (stating, “[c]apital punishment must be limited to those
offenders…whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of
execution’”).
319. Korell, 690 P.2d at 1002.
320. State v. Stacy, 601 S.W.2d 696, 704 (Tenn. 1980) (Henry J., dissenting).
321. See Michael K. Spodak et al., Criminality of Discharged Insanity
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insanity defense actually promotes public safety.322 For instance, a
study conducted in Maryland analyzed a large cohort of 86 insanity
acquittees over a fifteen year period after discharge from the
hospital.323 This study reported the acquittees’ arrests, convictions,
and incarcerations and found a clear reduction in arrests after
discharge from the hospital.324 The Maryland study also found that
87% of the cohort was not reincarcerated in nearly ten years after
release.325 These promising results are likely due to hospitalization
and conditional release programs.326 In another study conducted on
NGRI acquittees, only ten percent were rearrested after
discharge.327 Of that ten percent, the majority were rearrested for
nonviolent offenses.328 These findings suggest that insanity
acquittees do not present a serious danger to public safety.329 A
defendant’s future dangerousness is better treated in an
involuntary commitment to a mental institute rather than with a
release after a short prison sentence.

V. CONCLUSION
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Kahler, the circuits
were split on the constitutionality of abolishing the traditional
insanity defense. In March 2020, the United States Supreme Court
finally answered questions and concerns about the insanity defense
and the alternative mens rea approach.330 Before Kahler, four states
had replaced the traditional defense with the modified mens rea
Acquittees: Fifteen Year Experience in Maryland Reviewed, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 373, 382 (1984) (reporting on a compilation of insanity
acquittees in Maryland after release from discharge), Mark R. Wiederanders et
al., Forensic Conditional Release Programs and Outcomes in Three States, 20
INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249, 249-57 (1997) (studying the effects of conditional
release programs), Callahan, supra note 293 (studying the drop in the number
of acquittals after adopting the mens rea approach), George F. Parker,
Outcomes of Assertive Community Treatment in an NGRI Conditional Release
Program, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 291, 291-303 (2004) (describing the
five-year outcomes of an assertive community treatment on NGRI acquittals
and placed on conditional release in the community), and Henry J. Steadman
et al., Factors Associated with a Successful Insanity Plea, 140 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 401, 402-03 (1983) (revealing data of 202 insanity pleas entered in
Erie County, New York).
322. Brief of Amicus Curiae 290 Crim. Law and Mental Health Law
Professors, supra note 292 at 19-20.
323. Spodak et. al., supra note 321, at 373.
324. Id. at 373, 380.
325. Id. at 382.
326. Id. at 380, 382.
327. Wiederanders et al., supra note 321, at 253-55.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 255; Spodak et. al., supra note 321, at 382.
330. See generally Kahler, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (holding that states may abolish
the affirmative insanity defense).
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approach.331 However, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that
abolishing the insanity defense violates due process rights.332 The
United States Supreme Court reconciled the circuit split and ruled
that due process does not require the States to adopt an insanity
test based on a defendant being able to recognize that his or her
crime was morally wrong.333
While the Kahler decision answered whether the States can
abolish the moral-incapacity prong of the insanity test, there are
still major indeterminacies and variations of the test throughout
the country.334 This Comment proposed various means of resolving
these differences among the States. First, the United States
Supreme Court should reconsider and rule in favor of the
traditional insanity defense which turns on a defendant’s ability to
recognize right from wrong. Further, various changes need to be
made to the insanity defense, such as restricting the types of mental
health disorders and eliminating the volitional defense. Finally,
sentencing should not be left to the discretion of a judge, but rather
to an unbiased expert. In general, it is imperative that insane,
criminal offenders are relieved from criminal responsibility and
receive proper treatment.

331. IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3219 (2020); MONT.
CODE ANN. 46-14-102 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305(1) (2020).
332. Finger, 27 P.3d at 86.
333. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1037.
334. Brief of Amicus Curiae 290 Crim. Law and Mental Health Law
Professors, supra note 292 at 20-21.
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